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control of the power within the administ-
ration. So guards assigned to be present 
at self-help meetings started making de-
rogatory remarks and being insolent to 
outside people attending programs. This 
further reduced the attendance of the 
community volunteers (not the inmate 
visitors) from coming into the programs 
because they didn't feel they had to put 
up with rudeness and insults to assist in a 
program they were volunteering their 
time for. 
After the riots in the Maryland prison 
in 1972 the administration closed all of 
the self-help groups and claimed they 
were a contributing cause of the riots. It is 
true that a handful of inmates were abus-
ing the self-help meetings, but in no way 
did it ever reach the proportions claimed 
by the custodial force. What is more of a 
question to me is why the administration 
permitted the programs to reach a point 
of degeneration? Furthermore, if guards 
did witness contraband being brought 
into the institution, why was there never 
an inmate (that I know of) charged with 
an infration of institutional rules? 
If you have read this far I hope that 
you will also wonder what is going on in 
our correctional system, and that you 
will take the time to take another look. 
• 
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Warrantless 
Arrests 
by Lindsay Schlottman 
Henry Ogle Watson was arrested 
without a warrant on August 23, 1972 
during a meeting in a public restaurant 
with Mr. Khoury (an informer of known 
reliability). Six days prior to this meeting 
Khoury had telephoned a postal inspec-
tor, informing the inspector that Watson 
possessed a stolen credit card and had 
approached Khoury about using the 
card to their mutual advantage. Learn-
ing that Watson was going to supply ad-
ditional cards, the inspector asked 
Khoury to set up a meeting with Watson. 
Such a meeting, planned for August 22, 
was postponed by Watson to August 23, 
Khoury was instructed to light a cigarette 
atthis meeting if he learned from Watson 
that Watson had additional credit cards. 
Khoury lit the cigarette, whereupon 
postal officers arrested Watson without a 
warrant and Watson was removed to the 
street and given his Miranda rights. Wat-
son's person was searched and no credit 
cards were found. The postal inspector 
then asked Watson for permission to 
search his car which was in view. Watson 
said "Go ahead" and when the inspec-
tor said "If I find anything, it is going to 
June Chaplin 
go against you," Watson again replied 
"Go ahead." United States v. Henry 
Ogle Watson, 44 L.W. 4112 (January 
26, 1976). Two credit cards were found 
under a floor mat. Watson subsequently 
was charged with possessing stolen mail 
(in violation of 18 USc. § 1708), a 
felony. 
Prior to his trial, Watson moved to 
have the cards suppressed, claiming the 
arrest and the search were illegal (the ar-
rest because there was no probable 
cause and no arrest warrant; the search 
because Watson had not been told he 
could withhold consent). The federal dis-
trict court convicted Watson for illegally 
possessing the two cards. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court's con-
viction, basing the reversal on the inad-
missibility of the two cards. Specifically, 
the Court of Appeals held that Watson's 
arrest was illegal because the postal in-
spector failed to obtain an arrest warrant, 
although there was time to do so. 
Further, the Court of Appeals held that 
the consent to search by Watson was 
coerced and therefore an invalid ground 
for the warrantless search of the car. Uni-
ted States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849 
(1974). 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice White (Justice Stevens 
taking no part in the consideration or de-
cision of the case), reversed the Court of 
Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court 
first decided the issue of the validity of 
the warrantless arrest. 
The statutory basis of the authority of 
postal inspectors to make warrantless ar-
rests is embodied in 18 USc. § 3061 
(a). The Board of Governors of the 
Postal Service is expressly empowered 
to authorize (which it does by regulation 
39 CFR § 232.5 (a) (1975) ) Postal Ser-
vice officers and employees who per-
form inspection duties to 
"(3) make arrests without warrant for 
felonies cognizable under the laws of 
the United States if they have reason-
able grounds to believe that the per-
son to be arrested had committed or is 
committing such a felony." Watson, 
44 LW 4112,4113, citing § 3061 (a) 
(1976). 
The Court states that probable cause 
existed that a § 1708 offense was being 
committed and therefore the inspector 
and subordinates had the proper statu-
tory authority to arrest Watson without a 
warrant. In determining whether the ar-
rest comported with the Warrant Clause 
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court re-
viewed legal history. 
First the Court emphasized the con-
gressional nod to postal inspectors mak-
ing warrantless arrests on probable 
cause which is embodied in the enact-
ment of § 3061. In a footnote, previous 
decisions on this issue were discussed 
and it was pointed out that 
"In 1968 in the face of confusion gen-
erated by these decisions and two 
striking down warrantless arrests by 
postal inspectors as not authorized by 
federal statute or by state law ... (cita-
tions omitted), the Congress enacted 
18 U.s.c. § 3061 to make clear that 
postal inspectors are empowered to 
arrest without warrant upon probable 
cause (citation to congreSSional re-
cords omitted)." Watson, 44 L.W 
4112, 4113, n.4 (1976). [emphasis 
added] 
In short, the Court paid deference to 
congressional judgment and accepted 
such a provision as being reasonable 
and constitutional because of the "strong 
presumption of constitutionality due to 
an Act of Congress." Watson, 44 L.W 
4112, 4113 (1976), citing United States 
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948). 
Next, earlier Supreme Court decisions 
were analyzed, with the conclusion that 
"there is nothing in the Court's prior 
cases indicating that under the Fourth 
Amendment a warrant is required to 
make a valid arrest for a felony." Wat-
son, 44L,W 4112, 4113-4115 (1976). 
The Gerstein case was cited as support 
for the determination that the warrant 
requirement for all arrests would impose 
an "intolerable handicap" on law en-
forcement procedures. Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,113 (1975). The 
crux of the matter is whether there is 
probable cause for the arrest, not 
whether there is a warrant or time to get 
one. Watson, 44 L.W 4112, 4114 
(1976). 
For further support, the Court looked 
to common law and state constitutions 
and statutes which adopted the follow-
ing common law rule: 
" ... that a peace officer was permitted 
to arrest without a warrant for a mis-
demeanor or a felony committed in 
his presence as well as for a felony not 
committed in his presence if there was 
reasonable grounds for making the ar-
rest." Watson, 44 L.W 4112, 4114 
(1976). 
Early state cases construing this rule 
were discussed (Rohan v. Sawin, 59 
Mass. (5 Cush.) 281 (1851); Wakeley v. 
Hart, 6 Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814); and 
others). 
The Court then noted that in 1792 
Congress provided that federal marshals 
had the power to execute the laws equal 
to that of state sheriffs. This power has 
been cited in statutes up to the present 
time where, by recent statutes, federal 
marshals specifically are given authority 
to make warrantless. arrests for felonies 
on probable cause. In short, the Court is 
pointing to another congressional nod to 
warrantless arrests by federal authorities. 
As another basis for the conclusion 
that Watson's arrest was legal, the Court 
looked to state legislation. Almost all 
states expressly authorize felony arrests 
on probable cause without a warrant. 
Also, the American Law Institute has 
formulated a model statute which, in § 
120.1 of A Model Code of Pre-
arraignment Procedure: 
" ... authorize[s] an officer to take a 
person into custody if the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that the 
person to be arrested has committed a 
felony, or has committed a mis-
demeanor or petty misdemeanor in 
his presence." Watson, 44 L.W. 
4112,4115 (1976). 
The Court then returned to congres-
sional approval of warrantless arrests. 
FBI agents, who have authority to make 
warrantless arrests, are so authorized 
only upon exigent circumstances. Wat-
son, 44L.W. 4112, 4115, n.13 (1976). 
In concluding the opinion on Wat-
son's arrest, the Supreme Court 
categorized the argument that arrest 
warrants should be sought where prac-
ticable to do so as "judicial preference." 
Watson, 44L.W 4112,4116 (1976). In 
short, based on legal history (common 
law, state constitutional and statutory 
precedents, federal legislation and Su-
preme Court decisions), the Court con-
cluded that even where exigent cir-
cumstances do not exist warrantless ar-
rests may be proper. 
The Supreme Court simply deter-
mined that because Watson's consent to 
the search of his car wasn't the product 
of an illegal arrest, and further, because 
the Court of Appeals resolved the issue 
of voluntariness of Watson's consent on 
the basis of an illegal arrest, that his con-
sent should be reviewed. In a cursory 
manner, the Court looked over the de-
tails of the consent and decided that the 
fact of the arrest plus the failure of postal 
authorities to inform Watson that he 
could withhold consent to the search did 
not result in his consent being involun-
tary. The search was therefore found to 
be valid. 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist 
joined in Justice White's opinion. 
Justice Stewart filed a brief opinion 
concurring in the result in which he 
stated that the arrest which was based 
upon probable cause, made in a public 
place and not in a private place and in 
broad daylight, did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Powell wrote a concurring 
opinion in which he noted that the case 
could be disposed of on the ground that 
Watson's consent to the search was vol-
untary, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973), even assuming the 
warrantless arrest was unconstitutional, 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963). However, he focused on 
the arrest to determine its validity. 
The decision of the Court has created 
"a certain anomaly," stated Justice 
Powell, 
" ... by its being the first square holding 
that the Fourth Amendment permits a 
duly authorized law enforcement of-
ficer to make a warrantless arrest in a 
public place even though he had 
adequate opportunity to procure a 
warrant after developing probable 
cause for arrest." Watson, 44 L.W. 
4112,4117 (1976). 
Justice Powell emphaSized that warrant-
less searches are outside the Constitu-
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tion except in a few limited cir-
cumstances; thus the seizure of the per-
son, "the taking hold of one's person," 
should logically be limited in the same 
manner. Watson, 44 L. W. 4112, 4117 
(1976). He, however, acceded to the 
COL' t's conclusion on the validity of the 
arrest and also enumerated the practical 
problems in law enforcement if the 
Court of Appeals' decision were allowed 
to stand. Justice Powell concluded that 
the Court's sustaining of the warrantless 
arrest upon probable cause, " ... despite 
the resulting divergence between the 
constitutional rule governing searches 
and that now held applicable to seizures 
of the person ... " was justified. Watson, 
44 L.w. 4112, 4118 (1976). 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice 
Brennan, filed a dissenting opinion, 
based on the thesis that the Court did not 
decide the case on the narrow question 
presented. Justice Marshall determined 
that the arrest was valid since exiger.t cir-
cumstances were present (the officers 
had knowledge that a felony was being 
committed in their presence and that the 
suspect possessed the incriminating evi-
dence). 
However, Justice Marshall criticized 
the historical precedent which the Court 
relied upon in approving the arrest of 
Watson. He analyzed common law prin-
ciples and concluded that " ... the lesson 
of the common law, and those courts in 
this country that have accepted its rule, is 
an ambiguous one ... ", further, he 
criticized the Court's "unblinking 
literalism" in its analysis. Watson, 44 
L.w. 4112, 4121 (1976). 
Next, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137 (1803), as authority, Justice 
Marshall was critical of the deference the 
Court pays to state and federal statutes 
which have codified the common law 
rule. He emphasized that the existence 
of a statute is no defense to an uncon-
stitutional practice. 
He then examined the warrant re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Marshall agreed with Justice 
Powell that, logically, arrests and 
searches should be treated similarly in 
regard to this warrant requirement. The 
privacy rights of citizens are certainly bet-
ter protected when a warrant is required 
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for an arrest. Further, the legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in law enforcement is 
not unduly burdened by this require-
ment. In sum, when a warrant can be 
procured, it should be. Justice Marshall 
stated, "I believe the proper result is ap-
plication of the warrant requirement, as 
it has developed in the search context, to 
all arrests." Watson, 44 L. W. 4112, 
4124-4125 (1976). In reference to the 
search issue, Justice Marshall suggested 
that because it was of some complexity 
and had not been thoroughly briefed for 
the Court, the issue should be re-
manded. 
• 
Constitutional Quiz 
by Ronald Shapiro 
1. One spouse's consent to a search of 
the family reSidence, if voluntary and in-
telligent, renders the search valid, even if 
it was made without a warrent, without 
probable cause and without a warning 
from the police that such a search can 
legally be refused. 
Answer: True. Anyone with control over 
the premises can consent to its search; 
knowledge of the legal right to refuse is 
not always required for a valid consent. 
2. Police have rented a hotel room 
next to a room in which they have prob-
able cause to believe a major narcotics 
sale will take place. They may, without a 
warrant, place a device on the wall of 
their room to overhear the talk in the 
next room. 
Answer: False. The police must obtain a 
court order. 
3. Police arrest A, physically torture 
him, and obtain a statement revealing 
the location of evidence implicating B 
and C as well as A in a robbery. The evi-
dence is admissible against Band C. 
Answer: True. The Fourth Amendment 
rights of Band C have not been violated; 
consequently, they lack standing to chal-
lenge the torture of A. 
4. It is not constitutionally required, 
even in a serious felony prosecution, for 
a state to require a twelve-person jury or 
a unanimous verdict of the jurors. 
Answer: True. Neither is necessary for 
the interposition of the "commonsense 
judgment" of a group of laymen be-
tween the accused and his accuser. 
5. The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against sefl-incrimination can be in-
voked by a witness at a Congressional 
inquiry. 
Answer: True. Unless the witness is 
granted immunity, as was John Dean 
when he testified before the Watergate 
Committee. 
6. The Constitution vests the entire 
"power of pardon and reprieves for of-
fenses" against the United States in the 
President. 
Answer: True. Except in cases of im-
peachment. 
7. A state judge's salary is immune 
from federal income tax. 
Answer: False. The income tax has no 
real impact on the state's sovereign func-
tions. 
8. Actions by a state which give pre-
ference to local commerce over com-
merce from out of state are prohibited. 
Answer: True, unless Congress permits 
such preferences in the legislation gov-
erning such commerce. 
9. The burning of draft cards is a pro-
tected form of free speech under the First 
Amendment and thus cannot constitu-
tionally be prosecuted. 
Answer: False. Merely because the per-
son burning the draft card thereby in-
tends to express an idea, his conduct is 
not considered speech protected by the 
First Amendment. 
10. The abstract advocacy of a 
doctrine - even that the government 
should be forcibly overthrown - is con-
stitutionally protected as free speech. 
Answer: True. A "clear and present 
danger of violence" is not presented. 
